*The research in this paper builds on earlier work with Alan Duncan and Peter Dawkins. The idea for this paper arose from discussions with Alan and Peter. It updates the analysis of policy changes suggested in conference papers, adds alternative changes and evaluates a range of policy changes in such a way that they can be compared. We are grateful to John Creedy for his helpful comments.
Introduction
This paper evaluates policy change options to the taxation and social security systems aimed at encouraging work, and at reducing welfare dependency, where the options are made comparable to each other with regard to the additional expenditure they would require. Such an evaluation is relevant for several reasons. First, Australia is in the fortunate circumstance of having projected budget surpluses in excess of $10 billion in each of the next two years (Australian Government Treasury, 2005) . There is pressure to spend at least some of this budget surplus, but the question is how it can be spent most effectively so that it will have a positive effect on the Australian economy. Second, 20 per cent of the working-age population in Australia is at least partly dependent on welfare payments. Work is often seen as the best option for many individuals in this group. Even if the jobs initially are of low quality and wage rates, many of them provide on-the-job training and improve an individual's human capital, so that they may lead to higher-paying jobs in the future. Third, compared to other countries with a similar background to Australia, such as New Zealand, the US and the UK, Australia has low workforce participation rates. Fourth, there are concerns about the number of children growing up in jobless households, about one in six to seven children, and future decreases in participation rates due to an ageing population, which could result in increased dependency ratios (Productivity Commission, 2005; Australian Government Treasury, 2002) . Finally, there is a concern regarding the work-disincentive effects of the high level of effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) facing many low-wage workers as a result of the interaction between the system of income tax and means-tested social security allowances and pensions.
We have chosen five policy options, that seem promising alternatives to address the above issues. Each option has an annual cost of $5 billion at the current level of labour supply. The policy changes are variations in rates relative to the income tax and social security system of January 2006. First, the lowest income tax rate of 15 per cent could be reduced to 11 per cent.
Second, the tax-free threshold could be raised from $6000 to $10000 per year, or third, the low income tax offset could be increased from $235 to $1400 per year. A fourth alternative is to decrease all taper rates on own and partner's income for NewStart Allowances, Partner Allowances, Youth Allowances and Parenting Payments to 32 per cent. Introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit of $47 per week is a potential fifth approach. All five options increase in-work incomes. It is outside the scope of this paper to consider policy options that involve changes in the tax base or a tightening of social security eligibility or other conditions related to payment recipiency.
The performance and comparative merits of the alternatives can then be rated on a number of criteria. First, the expected budgetary cost. If a policy is effective, additional labour force participants are expected to enter the labour market and existing participants are expected to increase their hours, reducing the cost of a policy to the government after taking into account these labour supply responses. Second, the actual labour supply responses are of interest in themselves. That is, changes at the extensive and intensive margin (changed labour force participation and changed hours worked, respectively), and total hours worked are important measures of the success of a policy option. Third, an analysis of winners and losers from a policy change needs to be taken into account when evaluating a range of policy options. Two other criteria are the effects on the distribution of EMTRs, determining the work incentives, and the effect on the number of jobless households. The alternative policies are compared relative to the actual income tax and social security system of January 2006.
The structure of the paper is as follows. A brief introduction to the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), which is used to perform the analysis in this paper, is given in Section 2. Section 3 describes the proposed policy options in more detail. A static analysis of the policy options, assuming no behavioural changes in labour supply, is presented in Section 4. Allowing for labour supply responses, the results are expected to change. These results are discussed in Section 5. The final section summarises and concludes.
The MITTS model: a brief description
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The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS) is a behavioural tax microsimulation model. It provides for a detailed examination of the potential effects of policy changes to the tax and transfer system on individuals. In this paper, individuals are categorised by demographic type and income levels. The household demographic categories are single male, single female, married male, married female and sole parent, and household 1 For further details of the MITTS model, see Creedy et al. (2002 Creedy et al. ( , 2004 income is categorised by income quintiles. MITTS calculates the effects of the policy options as changes in net incomes, changes in EMTRs, changes in desired labour supply (hours of work and workforce participation), and changes in the numbers of jobless households for the different demographic and income categories of households. The results for individuals can be weighted and aggregated to represent population level results on changes in government revenue and expenditure.
For the comparative assessment of the policy change options, the base case situation is Labour supply responses, both at the extensive margin as leaving or entering the workforce and at the intensive margin by changing hours of work for those working, and changes in aggregate hours offered for work, are predicted using a discrete hours choice household utility maximising model. Only financial incentives are studied within MITTS. Individuals who are self-employed, over 65, a full-time student or disabled are left at their observed labour supply. This group is expected to behave differently from the other individuals of working age and to be less responsive to changes in financial incentives. The household utility function is specified as a quadratic function of household income and of leisure for each of the adult household members, with the parameters varying according to family category, number and ages of children, age and education level. These parameters have been 2 See Table 3 "Average Weekly Earnings, total earnings, original" and of work per week ranging from 0, being non-participation, 5, 10 through to 50 hours a week that maximises utility subject to the budget constraint. In effect, for each household category, a probability distribution of participation, of hours of work for those participating, and of total hours supplied could be computed. Based on the assumption that the observed hours of work are the optimal hours, a calibration of predicted hours to observed hours is carried out in the base run of the simulation. Only those utility function error terms that place an individual at the observed hours in the optimisation-of-utility step are selected and saved for the prediction of post-change labour supply. As a result, the starting point of every simulation is from the observed labour supply values.
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Then, for the policy change scenarios, the only changes made to the utility maximisation problem for each household is to change the budget constraint to reflect the changes in the taxation and/or social security systems. For the non-behavioural, or snapshot, picture, these policy changes to the budget constraint only have income effects measured as changes in disposable income, which we report as winners and losers and by dollars per week. However in addition, EMTRs have changed which together with the net income changes influence labour supply. To obtain the behavioural responses through changes in participation and in hours of work offered, MITTS re-computes the utility maximisation problem with the 4 Kalb (2002) provides a detailed description of the labour supply model underlying MITTS.
5 Kalb and Scutella (2002) discuss the wage and labour force participation model used to impute unobserved wages.
6 A more detailed description of the simulation approach taken can be found in Creedy and Kalb (2005) .
changed budget constraint, using the saved error terms. We report the effects of changes in the average or expected labour supply responses as households are faced with these changes in their budget constraint.
The pattern of responsiveness across different household categories in workforce participation and labour supply decisions to changes in their budget constraints, brought about by changes in the tax and social security systems they face, is similar to estimates reported in the literature of the elasticities of labour supply with respect to wage changes by household demographic type and income levels. The discrete labour supply choice models underlying MITTS do not readily generate explicit labour supply elasticities because changes in probability distributions over the discrete options are generated in response to policy changes. Further, the transformation from a wage change to a change in disposable income, both average and marginal, is a complex and variable function because of the effects of taxation and the withdrawal of social security benefits. However, point estimates based on the mean or expected responses, derived using the probability distributions over the discrete hours points, can be compared.
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In MITTS, the estimated utility functions in conjunction with the budget constraints vary widely across household demographic categories and within each category by household income levels, and by individual and household characteristics. This clearly demonstrates the importance of allowing for heterogeneous responses in understanding the effect of policy changes. Labour response rates to changes in the taxation and social security systems are largest for sole parent households, especially those on lower incomes, and for married women, again especially at lower income quintiles, when compared with single men and women and with married men. 8 In general, the labour supply responses to changes in the budget constraints are smaller at higher income levels suggesting that the substitution and income effects roughly offset each other, whereas the substitution effects dominate at lower income levels.
7 Elasticities by demographic groups and income quintiles are presented in Buddelmeyer, Freebairn and Kalb (2006) . 8 These patterns are clearly shown in Buddelmeyer, Freebairn and Kalb (2006) .
Description of the policy options in detail
All options have in common that the cost before taking into account any behavioural responses is 5 billion dollars a year. This implies there needs to be a trade off between the average gain in household income, conditional on benefiting from the policy change, and the number of families that benefit. Using graphs relating disposable income to gross income, this section provides a more detailed description of the five policy options. It discusses the amount of additional income available; the gross income range that would be affected by the changes, highlighting the different distributional impacts of the policy options; and it indicates areas of increases and decreases in the EMTR.
The first option of decreasing the lowest income tax rate from 15 per cent to 11 per cent applies to all taxpayers. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the increase in net income increases with gross income up to $21,600 to an extra $624 net income per annum at the maximum, and remains at this level for individuals earning more than $21,600. The EMTR falls by four percentage points for those with gross incomes between $6,000 and $21,600, and thereafter remains unchanged. Second, if the tax-free threshold is raised from $6,000 to $10,000 per annum, everyone earning more than $6,000 will have a higher net income due to this change. Those earning $10,000 or more benefit most as is clear from Figure 2 . Their increase in net income of $600 per annum is slightly lower than in the first option. In option 2, those earning between $10,000 and $21,000 are somewhat better off under this policy change than under the change described in option 1. Those with incomes between $6,000 and $10,000 experience a fall in the EMTR of 15 percentage points, with no changes for those with incomes over $10,000. A third option is an increase in the low income tax offset (LITO) to $1400 from $235 per year (see Figure 3) . The income tax reduction is targeted towards low-to middle-income groups, without providing tax relief to higher-income earners. Those earning over $56,600 do not benefit from this change. As a result, more can be given to individuals with lower incomes, in particular those earning less than $21,600 per annum. In effect, the tax-free threshold is raised to $15,333 annual income, reducing the EMTR by 15 percentage points from $6,000 to this point. The effective tax rate for income above $21,600 is raised from 30 per cent to 34 per cent as the LITO is withdrawn at 4 cents per extra dollar of income.
Relative to the base case, the EMTR is raised by four percentage points over the income range from $27,475 to $56,600 under this option. Individuals earning up to $27,649 would be better off under this reduced taper rate option.
In the simulation, we do not restrict eligibility of income support payments based on working hours. Therefore, applying a taper rate of 32 per cent, a full-time worker at a low wage rate which is withdrawn at 20 per cent as soon as household income is over the income threshold for FTB-A, given that they have no FTB-A to be withdrawn first.
By way of illustration, the amount of family payment and EITC at each level of gross income for a household with one child under twelve years of age is shown in Figure 5 . This approach is clearly more targeted than the first three options, with a maximum additional net income of $2,444 per year paid to households earning annual income in the range of $33,361 to $45,479
(for households with one child). Only those earning over $54,700 and $54,580 are better off under option 2 and option 1 respectively. Only individuals earning between about $14,790 and $15,902 would be better off under option 3 than under this option. The reduced taper option is more generous to individuals earning between about $2,718 and $25,443, but everyone else is better off under the EITC option. Relative to the current taxation and social security system, the EITC option reduces the EMTR over the phase in period by 7.3 percentage points, but it adds 20 percentage points during the phase out period for upper middle-income households.
Quite different patterns of budget constraint changes are represented by the five policy options. All five policy change options increase or do not reduce disposable incomes for anyone, but the number of winners and the magnitude of income gains vary by family type and income level across the policy options. While the EMTR is reduced or does not change with the lower tax rate and higher tax-free threshold options, the other three options reduce the EMTR for some, and particularly at low income levels, but increase the EMTR for others, especially middle-or high-income households. As a result, there is a complex mix of changes in income effects and substitution effects on workforce participation and hours of work decisions. The next section analyses and compares the changes in EMTRs and the average gain in net income. 
Results under the Assumption of Fixed Labour Supply
This section provides a comparison of the different options, assuming none of the households changes their behaviour due to the policy changes. This section compares the proportion of households who gain and the average gain, conditional on being a beneficiary of the policy change, by family type and family income quintile. In addition, average changes to EMTRs are displayed by family type and by family income quintile.
Distribution of gains from the policy changes
The top section of Table 1 Payments only benefit 30 and 21 per cent of families, respectively. However, given that each of the policy changes cost 5 billion dollars, the smaller number of families that gain under these targeted changes gain much more on average compared to the average gain of the larger number of families that are winners under a change reducing the lowest income tax rate or lifting the tax-free threshold.
Breaking down the percentage of winners by family type, couples with dependents have the highest percentage of winners under each policy change. This is because couples with dependents have a high labour force participation rate where at least one adult is employed.
Only under the option that reduces selected taper rates are singles with dependents more likely to benefit than couples with dependents. 
Impact of the policy changes on the distribution of EMTRs
It is difficult to substantially reduce EMTRs for everyone without spending much more than 5 billion dollars. Reducing the lowest income tax rate and increasing the tax-free threshold only reduce EMTRs for 12 and 3.5 per cent of working-age individuals, respectively, and in the former case only by 4 percentage points on average. These two options reduce EMTRs for some individuals and do not increase EMTRs for anyone 9 . By contrast, the other three policy changes clearly redistribute the burden of EMTRs. Increasing the LITO lengthens the income range over which the offset is tapered out compared to the current offset. Therefore, EMTRs will increase for families that were previously not eligible for the offset because their income was too high, but who have become eligible after the increase in the LITO. This option has the highest percentage of individuals who experience an increase in EMTR.
Similarly, due to the reduction in selected taper rates, more families have become eligible for the corresponding transfer payments and are now experiencing higher EMTRs because these payments are being withdrawn over a longer income span. Introducing a new transfer that is tapered out, such as the EITC, also increases EMTRs over part of the income range. There is a small fraction of families who experience an increase in EMTRs due to a reduction in the lowest income tax rate or an increase in the tax-free threshold. These are caused by very specific interactions, such as for instance between the tax-free threshold and the pensioner rebate. It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate these interactions in-depth. There are clear differences in the effects of the different policy options by both family type and household income quintile. For example, the group with the highest percentage benefiting from a reduction in taper rates through a reduced EMTR are the sole parents.
Married women have the highest percentage benefiting from an increase in the LITO.
EMTRs for hypothetical households in selected employment options
In Section 4.2, the EMTR is measured over an additional dollar of income, but here we examine net income changes between non-participation and part-time work ( Low-wage sole parents, under the current tax and social security systems, have relatively low
EMTRs when moving from non-work to part-time work, at 37 per cent (Table 3) . When moving from part-time to full-time work, the EMTR nearly doubles to 69 per cent. Reducing selected tapers or introducing an EITC decrease the EMTR from non-employment to part-time employment by 5 percentage points or more. The LITO does not help to reduce the EMTR when moving from part-time to full-time employment whereas the EITC reduces it from 69 to 65 per cent. For an average-wage sole parent this is still the case, although both options increase the EMTR of moving from part-time to full-time employment from 53 to 57
per cent. For a high-wage sole parent there are no substantial effects on EMTRs due to the policy changes. Low-wage single persons under current policy have a high EMTR for moving from nonemployment into part-time employment, of 69 per cent (Table 4) The difference between reducing selected tapers and introducing an EITC is most pronounced for an average-wage couple (Table 5) . Reducing selected taper rates greatly reduces the EMTR from non-employment to part-time employment for the head, bringing it down from 74 to 58 per cent. However, as a result the EMTR from moving from part-time to full-time employment is increased from 57 to 73 per cent. In contrast, the EITC reduces the nonemployment to part-time employment EMTR for the head by 5 percentage points only to 69 per cent, but at the same time, the EMTR from part-time to full-time employment is reduced slightly as well. However, the spouse's EMTR for taking up part-time employment is increased by 8 percentage points, although this is from a relatively low base of 32 per cent. 
Results when Allowing for Labour Supply Responses
This section provides a comparison of the policy options, allowing households to change their labour supply behaviour in response to the changes in disposable income and EMTR associated with the different policy options relative to the current (January 2006) tax and social security system. When discussing employment and average hours of work, it is assumed that individuals can change their hours to the desired level.
First, the labour force participation effects are compared in Table 6 , both in absolute numbers and in percentages of the relevant population by family type. The total increase in employment is highest for the change involving an increase in the LITO, with an increase in workforce participation of 61,649 persons or of 0.41 per cent, followed by the EITC option.
Reducing taper rates is expected to decrease the number of individuals in employment.
However, breaking the changes down by family type, different patterns are observed. For single-adult households and married men, the EITC option appears to be most effective in terms of encouraging labour market entry, and only for married women is the LITO option the most effective in this respect. However, the LITO option is the second-best alternative for all other groups. The decrease in the lowest tax rate and the increase in the tax-free threshold have very similar effects, which is not surprising when comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 . The tax rate decrease is expected to be only slightly more effective. A second comparison of the options examines the changes in hours of work per week effects. Table 7 reports the average hours change and the percentage change by family type. The table
shows that the tax rate decrease is most effective overall in increasing the average hours of work. The reduction in taper rates again has a negative effect. Comparing the two tables shows that for singles the reduced taper rates increase participation but decrease the overall number of hours worked. As in Table 6 , there are large differences between the different family types. Only for married men and women is the tax rate decrease the most effective in terms of increasing the average hours of labour supply. For the other groups, the EITC is most effective.
Both Table 6 and Table 7 show that the income effect dominates the substitution effect for married women when an EITC is introduced (and when taper rates are relaxed), which is a phenomenon commonly found for married women's labour supply. This is one disadvantage of an EITC, which is partly due to the means testing on family income and partly due to the increase in available household income. The former increases EMTRs for secondary earners, who fall into the withdrawal range of EITC, while at the same time increasing available net income over a range of gross household incomes. Both effects work in the same direction, discouraging labour supply of the secondary earner.
A third outcome of interest is the number of working-age jobless households by family type for the different policy options. Table 8 displays the reduction in the number of jobless households under the different policy changes. Overall, the EITC is clearly most successful at reducing the number of jobless families. In fact, EITC is the most effective policy to reduce the number of jobless families for each of the demographic subgroups. Reducing selected taper rates is nearly as effective for couple families, but not for the other family types. Table 9 presents the final comparison between the different policy options on the predicted cost to government after taking into account all labour supply responses. Decreasing the lowest tax rate has the lowest cost after the expected behavioural responses are taken into account. Whether this option is rated as the most successful depends on the aim of the policy changes. If the aim of the policy change is to increase the number of persons participating in the labour force, then this option may well be the most cost efficient of the five options.
However, if a reduction in jobless households were the target, then the EITC would be the most cost effective option. Naturally, the policy changes could have been proposed with more than one objective in mind, which would need to be taken into account when assessing the different options. 
Summary and Conclusions
Using about $5 billion per year of the budget surplus, the paper explores the relative merits of different policy options in changing the tax and social security system to make paid work more attractive to reduce the number of jobless households and to increase the supply of labour. The five options considered are: reduction of the bottom marginal income tax rate from 15 per cent to 11 percent; raising the income tax-free threshold from $6,000 to $10,000;
increasing the low income tax offset ( The option of reducing the taper rates on social security allowances for those of working age is the least attractive of the five options considered. While the lower withdrawal rates reduce the EMTR for about 7.5 per cent of households, the extended income range over which the allowances are withdrawn raises the EMTR for another 15 per cent of households. The lower EMTR encourages a significant increase in the participation rates of sole parents and in aggregate the policy option is estimated to reduce the number of jobless households by about 26,000. However, the complementary zone of higher EMTR induces a large fall in the participation rate of married females. In aggregate, across the economy both labour force participation and hours offered for work fall. These behavioural responses cause the annual budget cost of the option to increase from $5 to $6.4 billion.
The income tax policy change options of reducing the bottom marginal tax rate or of raising the tax-free threshold have similar general effects. Both reduce marginal income tax rates and the EMTR at the lower income levels in excess of $6,000 a year and up to $21,600 for the lower rate option and $10,000 for the higher threshold option. Those with higher incomes experience flat sum reductions in tax paid, but no changes in their marginal tax rates. All taxpayers with taxable income above $6,000 gain, and in total 67 per cent of all households gain. The lower EMTR for both options encourage workforce participation by about 40,000
people and reduce the number of jobless households by about 25,000. The labour supply increase would reduce the budget cost by about 10 per cent to $4.5 billion. The lower rate option achieves a smaller reduction in the marginal tax rate but over a wider taxable income range when compared with the higher threshold option. The EMTR falls for 11.5 per cent of households with the tax rate reduction option and for just 3.5 per cent of households with the threshold increase option. The tax rate reduction is estimated to be slightly more effective in reducing the number of jobless households and in increasing the supply of labour.
Compared with the lower bottom tax rate and higher threshold options, which provide average tax reductions to all middle-and high-income taxpayers as well as lower-income taxpayers, the LITO and EITC options target the reduction of taxation on those households with lower incomes. In essence, the reductions in marginal and average tax rates at lower income levels, and the associated reductions in EMTR, are recaptured for those at higher income levels. This raises the EMTR for many households on middle incomes. In terms of after-tax income gains, it is estimated that 56 per cent of all households benefit from LITO and 30 per cent benefit from the EITC, with those in the second income quintile being the largest winners under both options. Whereas the LITO means tests the tax offset on income of the individual, the EITC recaptures the low income work incentive by testing against income of the family. One consequence of this key difference is that LITO is more attractive to secondary income earners than is the EITC, whereas the EITC provides greater incentives for sole parents to join the workforce and to increase hours of work than does the LITO option. In terms of the aggregate effects, it is estimated that LITO is slightly more effective in increasing workforce participation and hours of work, an increase of 62,000 participants and of 0.08 hours of work per week on average, when compared with the EITC, with an increase of 52,000 participants and of 0.07 hours per person per week. On the other hand, the EITC is far more effective in reducing the number of jobless households, with 62,000, or 3.7 per cent of current jobless households, against 39,000. The labour supply behavioural responses recapture about 6 per cent of the original $5 billion annual budget outlay, resulting in a net cost of about $4.7 billion a year.
What then are the relative merits of the pairing of LITO and the EITC versus the pairing of a higher tax-free threshold and a lower bottom tax rate? In terms of redistributional effects, although there are no losers under any option, the latter pairing provides income tax reductions to all taxpayers including over two-thirds of all households, whereas only a third to a half of all households benefit from the LITO or EITC options. The gains for those on low incomes are greater for the LITO and EITC options. In terms of the effects of changes in EMTR and incentives to work, the LITO and EITC options, which target EMTR reductions on low income earners who have relatively high labour supply elasticities, are more effective in increasing labour force participation than are the reduced bottom tax rate and higher taxfree threshold options. On the other hand, the lower bottom tax rate and higher tax-free threshold options are more effective in increasing overall labour supply than LITO, and especially the EITC. As a consequence, although the EITC and LITO recapture some of the revenue outlay under fixed labour supply, this is less than for the other pairing. In terms of reducing the number of jobless households and thus the rate of dependence on welfare, it is estimated that the EITC is clearly superior. The reduction in the number of jobless households is more than double the reduction compared to using the lower tax rate and higher threshold policy options. Not surprising, and as is normally encountered, when there are several criteria or objectives of tax policy change it will be desirable to use more than one tax and social security system policy option as part of a package. H o u r l y w a g e P a r t n e r ------ Share of extra income the family loses when the spouse moves from non-work to full-time work 52% 50% 50% 48% 50% 48% Table 17 Average wage earning couple 
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